Dynastic Fratricide: The Secret to the Ottomans' Success



        Fratricide, few concepts could be more repugnant to Westerners than the idea of killing your brother or brothers.  However, in the Ottoman Empire, fratricide was the modus operandi of dynastic succession, from the beginning of the empire in the late thirteenth century, until 1603 when Ahmed I became sultan.  It was also around this time that the Ottoman Empire entered its long period of decline.  (The empire reached its territorial height in 1570 and their last territorial gain, Crete, was made in 1669).  Was it a coincidence the decline of the empire occurred simultaneously with the dynasty's abandonment of fratricidal practices?  It does not seem likely.  In fact, the Ottomans' use of fratricide gave them a unique advantage over their European opponents.
         From its very conception, the Ottoman dynasty made use of fratricide in the broadest sense of the word (i.e. the killing of one's close relatives).  In his rise to power as Emir of Sogut, Osman killed his uncle Dundar to secure his succession.  This began the Ottomans' pattern of primogenitive succession.  Succession based on primogeniture was unusual for Islamic dynasties, which tended to base succession on tribal leadership role; i.e. power passed from the oldest member of the family to its next oldest member. (Primogeniture dominated Ottoman succession for the next three hundred years).  Previous Islamic dynasties made use of fratricide as well.  In fact, one might say it was necessary for Islamic dynasties since the practice of polygamy produced a dangerously high number of male heirs.1
        Realizing this to be the case, the ulema (religious intellectual community) condoned the practice of fratricide as a way to prevent civil strife.2  The idea of fratricide, providing stability, was reinforced by secular authors of the time as well.  In the early 1600's, Mar'I al-Karmi wrote in his panegyric of the Ottoman dynasty, Qala'id al'iqyan fi fada'il al Uthman,  "One of their virtues is that they kill their children to prevent civil strife and possible dangers to the state."  Here, al-Karmi called fratricide a virtue, not just a mere necessity.  In a later part of his treatise, he questions the morality of such an act, but notes that the ulema permits it and that sometimes "it is necessary to kill one third in order to improve the other two thirds."3  In fact, it appears that al-Karmi was correct; the killing of some of the members of the dynasty did in fact improve the dynasty overall.
        As mentioned above, Osman I began the tradition of committing fratricide.  Sometimes, as was the case with Mehmed I and Murad II, the act of fratricide took the form of a dynastic civil war between brothers, where only one was left alive at its conclusion.  Mehmed II, like his predecessors, practiced fratricide; he even went a step further, he codified the practice as a law.  Mehmed's legal code, Kanunname, contained a clause that stated, "For welfare of the state, the one of my sons to whom God grants the sultanate may lawfully put his brothers to death.  A majority of the ulema considers this permissible."4
        In the late sixteenth century, the first moves were made away from the practice of fratricide.  Sultan Murad III sent only his eldest son, Mehmed III, to the provinces to serve as a governor; he had all of his other sons confined at court.  In the past, the practice had been to send several of one's sons to the provinces so they could learn the art of governing by serving as governors.  Then, those sons would be able to compete for the throne.  By confining all of his sons, with the exception of his predetermined heir, Murad III allowed Mehmed III to come to power without proving himself.  When Mehmed III did so, he committed the greatest act of fratricide ever recorded in the Ottoman Empire: he ordered the strangulation of all of his nineteen brothers.  Mehmed also decided to keep all of his sons at court, in an effort to prevent any possibility of his sons leading a rebellion against him.  Mehmed II even constructed a special compound for his sons to be held in; this isolated structure, which was contained within the walls of Topkapi Palace, would later be called the "Cage."5
        With the advent of the "Cage,"  the practice of fratricide was no longer necessary.  Mehmed III's son and successor, Ahmed I, chose to simply keep his mentally ill brother Mustafa imprisoned during his reign, instead of killing him.  He also had all of his sons imprisoned in the "Cage."  This practice became known as the Kafes system.  Following Ahmed I's death, one of his chief concubines, Turhan, maneuvered to have Mustafa made sultan because she feared that Ahmed's oldest son, Osman, would become sultan.  Osman was the son of Ahmed I and his other chief concubine, Hadice.  Turhan worried that if Osman became sultan, he would call for the execution of her sons.  Turhan's meddling resulted in a shift away from primogeniture towards the traditional Islamic pattern of succession, from the dynasty's oldest member to its next oldest member.  (Ironically, Turhan's intrigue was pointless.  Mustafa was deposed after a very short time on the throne because of his mental condition.  He was replaced by Osman, and despite Turhan's fears, Osman did not execute her sons).6
        Life within the "Cage" was difficult.  Social interaction between the different prisoners was limited.  For that matter, freedom of movement, in general, was highly limited.  Prisoners were sometimes allowed personal attendants and female companions, but no prisoner was allowed to father children.  The social isolation of the "Cage" failed to provide its residents with the opportunity to develop their leadership skills.  Considering that some of them went on to become sultans, their lack of appropriate skills was highly unfortunate.  In more severe cases, the "Cage" experience resulted in outright insanity.  A good example of this was Sultan Ibrahim I.  His apparent mental problems were either caused completely or at least exacerbated by the twenty-three years of his life he spent isolated in the "Cage."7
        Fratricide, while cruel, allowed only the most capable of the sultan's sons to become the heir apparent.  A sultan's struggle against his brothers provided him with the ability to plot effectively against his enemies later.  Furthermore, for those sultans who met their brothers on the battlefield to secure their ascension, the practice of fratricide could provide valuable military experience.  As fratricide was phased out and the Kafes system was implemented, sultans also lost the experience gained from time spent as provincial governors.  Thus the Kafes system not only denied heirs important experiences that fratricide provided them with, but it also hindered their ability to develop important skills at all.  The "Cage" environment was not conducive to an education in statesmanship or military skill, both of which were essential characteristics of a successful ruler.
        Fratricide provided the Ottomans with a distinct advantage over other neighboring powers that chose their leaders on birthright alone.  Early Ottoman sultans had been made to prove themselves and defend themselves from external threats before they were even crowned.  When fratricide was phased out, the Ottomans lost this advantage.  The Kafes system, which was then put in place, actually led to the Ottomans being at a disadvantage with their enemies.  Sultans without any of the proper training, which they were isolated from receiving, were allowed to rule.  The inept rulers the Kafes system produced were nothing like the hardened and skilled Sultans that fratricide resulted in.  These unskilled and unprepared rulers failed to stand up to their European counterparts, and their ineptitude was one of the major reasons for the Ottoman decline.

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1 Alderson, Anthony Dolphin, The Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956), 4-5.
2 Ibid., 27.
3 Winter, Michael, "A Seventeenth-Century Arabic Panegyric of the Ottoman Dynasty," Asian and African
         Studies 13:2 (July 1979) 144-145.
4 Inalcik, Halil, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600, (New York: Praeger Publisher,
         1973), 59.
5 Ibid., 60-61.
6 Alderson, 10-12.
7 Ibid., 32-35.



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